The Single Economic Entity Doctrine and Corporate Group Responsibility in European Antitrust Law
International Competition Law Series Volume 57
Recognizing that inclusion of ‘groups’ or ‘concerns’ in the assessment of antitrust enforcement is essential to prevent undertakings from circumventing the Treaty’s antitrust provisions, the author of this in-depth analysis critically evaluates relevant ECJ cases and Commission pronouncements in order to determine whether current practice under the single economic entity doctrine amounts to an appropriate and effective enforcement of this increasingly significant aspect of European competition law. Among the issues and topics analysed are the following:
- the group or concern privilege under Article 101 (1) TFEU;
- the application of the single economic entity concept for the attribution of liability;
- the burden of proving ‘decisive influence’;
- the parent company’s rights of defence;
- corporate reorganizations;
- ‘piercing the corporate veil’;
- control versus dominance;
- the requisite degree of control;
- potential versus actual control;
- the standards of legal separation and organizational autonomy;
- the existence of a common commercial strategy or financial dependence; and
- the extension of jurisdiction in antitrust matters.
|Resources||Table of Contents|
|Update Frequency||As Needed|
|Product Line||Kluwer Law International|
Chapter 1 The Single Economic Entity Doctrine as an Essential Criterion for the Application of Antitrust Law on a Corporate Group.
Chapter 2 The Implementation of Article 101(1) TFEU on a Corporate Group of Companies: Practice of the Commission and the European Courts.
Chapter 3 The ‘Single Economic Entity’ Doctrine: An Assessment of ‘Privileges and Responsibility’ in a Corporate Group.
Chapter 4 Intermediate Result.
Chapter 5 The Concept of Corporate Liability.
Chapter 6 An Assessment of Corporate Group Liability on the Basis of ‘Organizational Autonomy’.
Chapter 7 Conclusion.