M&A: The Industrial Organization Perspective
- How does a merger affect the insider firm's profitabifity?
- Why may outsiders stock market value increase or decrease following a merger?
- What are the expected welfare effects of a merger?
- What sort of arguments can be used for merger defense? How do economists model the firm's merging decision?
- How can the authorities simulate the price effects of a horizontal merger?
- Is post-merger entry likely to compensate the effects of a merger?
The discussion proceeds from an analysis of the simplest exercise of market power to evermore complex merger environments. In their detailed coverage of policy evaluation of proposed acquisitions, the authors provide a merger simulation toolkit which can be applied to important recent judicial decisions in the field. This book will be of great value not only to academics in microeconomics and industrial organization, but also to lawyers and officials seeking expert practical guidance in the business or administrative responsibilities surrounding mergers and acquisitions.
|Product Line||Kluwer Law International|
Contents 1 Introduction I Theory 2 Quantity Competition 3 Price Competition 4 Other Strategic Variables 5 Producers of Complements 6 Efficiencies 7 Entry and Exit 8 Merger Games II Policy 9 Policy Implications 10 Merger Simulation 11 Merger Cases, Conclusions, Bibliography